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CVE-2026-47144
medium
CVSS 5.5
Path Traversal in shamefile (CVE-2026-47144)
Summary
path traversal in shamefile (CVE-2026-47144). Confidential information can be exposed externally. Exploitable via ``shamefile.yaml``. Mitigation: upgrade to `0.1.7` or later.
AI summary snake-internal / snake-material-v2
A vulnerability tracked as **CVE-2026-47144** has been found in shamefile.
Attackers can target a specific entry point like ``shamefile.yaml`` over the network to misuse the product.
Confidential information can be exposed externally. CVSS score: 5.5/10.
What to do: upgrade shamefile to **0.1.7** or later.
If unsure, ask your IT team or search "shamefile CVE-2026-47144" on the vendor's site.
CVE-2026-47144 (shamefile) — CWE-22 / CVSS v3 5.5
Attack vector: local / unauthenticated
Attack surface: `shamefile.yaml`
Patched: `0.1.7` — apply immediately
Workaround: Do not run `shame next` against untrusted `shamefile.yaml`.
Plan: 1) Audit SBOM/dependencies, 2) Stage→prod upgrade, 3) Add WAF/proxy monitoring on affected endpoints, 4) Hunt IOCs in logs.
Refs: see the GHSA / vendor advisory / patched release linked on this page.
❓ What is the problem
**Path traversal** (CWE-22) exists in shamefile. Attackers reach the vulnerable code path via ``shamefile.yaml`` without authentication.
📍 Affected scope
shamefile — . Attack surface: `shamefile.yaml`.
🔥 Severity
Severity: Medium (CVSS 5.5/10). Confidential information can be exposed externally
🔧 How to fix
Update to **0.1.7**.
🛡️ Workaround
Workaround: Do not run `shame next` against untrusted `shamefile.yaml`.
🔍 Detection
Search webserver/proxy logs for unusual request patterns matching this CVE's known IOCs. Run `grep -r 'shamefile' .` against your dependency files (package-lock.json, requirements.txt, go.sum) to find affected services.
Response Actions (7 steps)
Concrete steps and command examples for SOC/SRE teams to execute in order
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1Identify exposure identify
grep -r 'shamefile' . | grep -v node_modulesリポジトリと本番環境の依存ファイル (package-lock.json / requirements.txt / go.sum / Gemfile.lock 等) で `shamefile` を grep し、稼働しているサービス・バージョンを把握する。
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5Apply temporary workaround mitigate
Do not run `shame next` against untrusted `shamefile.yaml`.パッチが適用されるまでの応急処置として、Do not run `shame next` against untrusted `shamefile.yaml`. を実施。回避策の副作用 (機能低下) を確認した上で。
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6Apply patch patch
Upgrade shamefile to 0.1.7ステージング環境で 0.1.7 に上げて回帰テスト → 本番反映。回帰テストはアプリの主要ハッピーパスと、Step 3 で見つけた異常検知の続報チェックを含めること。
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7Post-deployment verification verify
Confirm patched version is live in productionパッチ適用後、ステージングで PoC または同等の悪用パターンを再現して脆弱性が閉じたことを確認。本番では Step 3 と同じログクエリでアラート再発が無いか継続監視。
Affected packages
pip
shamefile
[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.1.7"}]}]
npm
shamefile
[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.1.7"}]}]
rust
shamefile
[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.1.7"}]}]
PyPI
shamefile
[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.1.7"}]}]
crates.io
shamefile
[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.1.7"}]}]