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GHSA-h5x8-xp6m-x6q4

Vulnerability in @jhb.software/payload-cloudinary-plugin (GHSA-h5x8-xp6m-x6q4)

Summary

vulnerability in @jhb.software/payload-cloudinary-plugin (GHSA-h5x8-xp6m-x6q4). Risk of unauthorized operations or information disclosure. Exploitable via `POST /api/cloudinary-generate-signature`. Mitigation: upgrade to `0.4.0` or later.

AI summary snake-internal / snake-material-v2

A vulnerability tracked as **GHSA-h5x8-xp6m-x6q4** has been found in @jhb.software/payload-cloudinary-plugin. Attackers can target a specific entry point like `POST /api/cloudinary-generate-signature` over the network to misuse the product. Risk of unauthorized operations or information disclosure. CVSS score: ?/10. What to do: upgrade @jhb.software/payload-cloudinary-plugin to **0.4.0** or later. If unsure, ask your IT team or search "@jhb.software/payload-cloudinary-plugin GHSA-h5x8-xp6m-x6q4" on the vendor's site.
GHSA-h5x8-xp6m-x6q4 (@jhb.software/payload-cloudinary-plugin) — CWE-347 / Attack surface: POST /api/cloudinary-generate-signature / `paramsToSign` / `notification_url` / `initClientUploads` Patched: `0.4.0` — apply immediately Workaround: set clientUploads: true Plan: 1) Audit SBOM/dependencies, 2) Stage→prod upgrade, 3) Add WAF/proxy monitoring on affected endpoints, 4) Hunt IOCs in logs. Refs: see the GHSA / vendor advisory / patched release linked on this page.
❓ What is the problem
**A vulnerability** (CWE-347) exists in @jhb.software/payload-cloudinary-plugin. Attackers reach the vulnerable code path via `POST /api/cloudinary-generate-signature` without authentication.
📍 Affected scope
@jhb.software/payload-cloudinary-plugin — . Attack surface: POST /api/cloudinary-generate-signature / `paramsToSign` / `notification_url` / `initClientUploads`.
🔥 Severity
Severity: ?. Risk of unauthorized operations or information disclosure
🔧 How to fix
Update to **0.4.0**.
🛡️ Workaround
Workaround: set clientUploads: true
🔍 Detection
Search webserver/proxy logs for unusual `POST /api/cloudinary-generate-signature` requests with malformed payloads or SQL meta-characters. Run `grep -r '@jhb.software/payload-cloudinary-plugin' .` against your dependency files (package-lock.json, requirements.txt, go.sum) to find affected services.

Response Actions (7 steps)

Concrete steps and command examples for SOC/SRE teams to execute in order

  1. 1
    Identify exposure identify
    grep -r '@jhb.software/payload-cloudinary-plugin' . | grep -v node_modules

    リポジトリと本番環境の依存ファイル (package-lock.json / requirements.txt / go.sum / Gemfile.lock 等) で `@jhb.software/payload-cloudinary-plugin` を grep し、稼働しているサービス・バージョンを把握する。

  2. 3
    Hunt for indicators of compromise detect
    grep 'POST /api/cloudinary-generate-signature' /var/log/nginx/access.log | grep -E '(unusual_payload|sqli_pattern)'

    アクセスログで `POST /api/cloudinary-generate-signature` への異常なリクエスト (不正な認証ヘッダ・SQLメタ文字)を過去 30〜90日分捜索。WAF/SIEM があれば該当パスのアラート発火履歴を確認。

  3. 5
    Apply temporary workaround mitigate
    set clientUploads: true

    パッチが適用されるまでの応急処置として、set clientUploads: true を実施。回避策の副作用 (機能低下) を確認した上で。

  4. 6
    Apply patch patch
    Upgrade @jhb.software/payload-cloudinary-plugin to 0.4.0

    ステージング環境で 0.4.0 に上げて回帰テスト → 本番反映。回帰テストはアプリの主要ハッピーパスと、Step 3 で見つけた異常検知の続報チェックを含めること。

  5. 7
    Post-deployment verification verify
    Replay attack against POST /api/cloudinary-generate-signature on staging to confirm patch closes the vector

    パッチ適用後、ステージングで PoC または同等の悪用パターンを再現して脆弱性が閉じたことを確認。本番では Step 3 と同じログクエリでアラート再発が無いか継続監視。

Affected packages

npm @jhb.software/payload-cloudinary-plugin
[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.4.0"}]}]

References

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